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Cockpit automation has been developed to reduce pilots’ workload and 
increase pilots’ performance. However, previous studies have demonstrated 
that failures of automated systems have significantly impaired pilots’ 
situational awareness. The increased application of automation and the trend 
of pilots to rely on automation have changed pilot’s role from an operator to 
a supervisor in the cockpit. Based on the analysis of 257 ASRS reports, the 
result demonstrated that pilots represent the last line of defence during 
automation failures, though sometimes pilots did commit active failures 
combined with automation-induced human errors. Current research found 
that automation breakdown has direct associated with 4 categories of 
precondition of unsafe acts, including ‘adverse mental states’, ‘CRM’, 
‘personal readiness’, and ‘technology environment’. Furthermore, the 
presence of ‘CRM’ almost 3.6 times, 12.7 times, 2.9 times, and 4 times 
more likely to occur concomitant failures in the categories of 
‘decision-errors’, ‘skill-based error’, ‘perceptual errors’, and ‘violations’. 
Therefore, CRM is the most critical category for developing intervention of 
Human-Automation Interaction (HAI) issues to improve aviation safety. 
The study of human factors in automated cockpit is critical to understand 
how incidents/accidents had developed and how they could be prevented. 
Future HAI research should continue to increase the reliability of 
automation on the flight deck, develop backup systems for the occasional 
failures of cockpit automation, and train flight crews with competence of 
CRM skills in response to automation breakdowns. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The development of advanced technologies in 
computer sciences have made mass applications of 
automation on the flight deck, and also introducing all 
aspects of Human-Automation Interaction (HAI) issues 
in flight operations. Given these technical capabilities, 
which systems should be automated and to what extent 
on the flight deck have to be further examined for 
improving aviation safety. Parasuraman, Sheridan [1] 
outlined a model for types and levels of automation that 
provides a framework and an objective basis for making 
appropriate adoptions. It is important to understand that 
automations change human cognitive activities and can 
impose new coordination demands on the pilots. Despite 
considerable effort by human factors experts, HAI 
breakdowns in the cockpit are still a key safety concern 
in aviation [2, 3]. Through the coordination of the best 
features of human and computer, automated systems 
provided effectiveness in flight operations, such as 
auto-throttles which are efficient in terms of fuel 
consumption and energy management, and the Integrated 
navigational systems which are able to autonomously fly 
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the aircraft with remarkable precision in both vertical and 




ASRS Aviation Safety Reporting System 
CFIT Control Flight Into Terrain 
CRM crew resource management 
EGPWS Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning 
Systems 
FMA Flight Mode Annunciator 
FMS Flight Management Systems 
HAI Human-Automation Interaction 
HFACS Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
System 
ILS Instrument Landing System 
INS Inertial Navigation System 
  
MCP Mode Control Panel 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration 
PFD Primary Flight Display 
SEREC Science and Engineering Research Ethics 
Committee 
 
The evolution of advanced technology in the cockpit 
is only a part of the solution to overall safety 
improvements for flight operations. The analysis of 
accident investigation reports has consistently shown that 
human factors involved in 70-80% of incidents and 
accidents, and this figure has remained constantly over 
decades, with no sign of decreasing [4, 5]. In a 
worldwide survey of causal factors of accidents in 
commercial aviation, it was found that in 88% of the 
cases the crew was identified as a causal factor; in 76% 
of instances the crew were implicated as the primary 
causal factor (European Aviation Safety Agency, 2012). 
Therefore, the study of the human-automation interaction 
in automated cockpit is critical to understand how 
incidents/accidents had developed and how they could be 
prevented.. 
 
II. COCKPIT AUTOMATION CREATED HAI 
ISSUES ON THE FLIGHT DECK 
 
Automated aids on the flight deck are designed 
specifically to decrease pilots’ workload by performing 
many complex tasks simultaneously including 
information processing, system monitoring, diagnosing 
potential risks/cautions, and controlling the aircraft.  
Wiener and Curry [7] proposed that automation systems 
have superior information processing abilities, and are 
able to deal with large amounts of information whilst 
concurrently maintaining precise control. The invention 
of Flight Management Systems was designed not only to 
keep the aircraft on course, but also to manage many 
aspects of the flight such as calculating fuel-efficient 
routes, navigation, detecting and diagnosing system 
failures. An inevitable impact of this high level of 
automation is that it has changed the way pilots perform 
tasks and make decisions [8].   
Human-centered design of automation has been 
cited as a desirable goal which should focus on 
supporting the human operator of the systems matching 
the hardware, software and operating environments. This 
design philosophy provides guidelines to direct decisions 
concerning the interaction of the flight crew with the 
aircraft systems, such as allocation of functions between 
pilots and automated systems, levels of automation, and 
information formatting [9]. In addition, the use of a high 
degree of automation decreases the likelihood of pilots 
expending the mental effort to process all the available 
information in cognitively complex ways. While 
advanced automation technology may solve some 
problems, it often introduces others. In aviation, new 
technology can be part of a solution, but it is important to 
remember that it will bring new issues that may not have 
been anticipated and must be considered in a larger 
context, such as philosophy of interfaces design, training, 
systems integration, and operational characteristics of 
human operators [10, 11]. 
 
III. THE RISK OF HUMAN-AUTOMATION 
BREAKDOWN ON THE FLIGHT DECK 
 
Cockpit automation has been developed to reduce 
pilots’ workload and increase pilots’ performance. 
However, previous studies have demonstrated that 
failures of automation have significantly impaired pilots’ 
situational awareness. European Aviation Safety Agency 
conducted a cockpit automation survey which confirmed 
that the most common factors relating to the peaks of 
stress and workload generated by unanticipated situations 
requiring manual override of automation, are those which 
are difficult to understand and manage, and this could 
subsequently create effects of automation surprise 
(European Aviation Safety Agency, 2012). Flight crews 
may spend too much time trying to understand the 
original conditions which may in turn distract them from 
other priority tasks and flying the aircraft. Mode 
confusion of automation presents a difficult situation in 
modern cockpits which erodes the safety barriers and 
places additional workload onto the pilots. Human factors 
issues were involved in 70-80% of incidents and 
accidents, based on the analysis of accidents investigation 
reports around the world. This figure has remained 
constant over several decades. Previous research applied 
the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 
(HFACS) which based upon empirical evidence of how 
actions and decisions at higher managerial levels in the 
operation of commercial aircraft linked to errors on the 
flight deck and subsequent accidents [2, 5]. 
Automation system generally are reliable and 
consistent in applying repetitive actions and monitoring 
small status changes precisely, not easily detectable by 
crews. However, automation must be applied prudentially, 
as new generation of pilots may lack basic flying skills if 
the automation disconnects or fails. Parasuraman and 
Riley [13] described the tendency of HAI issues on the 
flight deck including automation abuse, automation 
disuse and automation misuse. The use of a high degree 
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of automation decreases the likelihood that pilots will 
make the cognitive effort to process all the available 
information in cognitively complex ways.  An inevitable 
facet of this high level of automation has changed the 
way pilots perform tasks and make decisions. The 
evidence of automation-induced commission errors was 
produced by full-mission simulations in the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Ames 
Advanced Concepts Flight Simulator [14]. Automation 
commission errors are errors made when decision makers 
inappropriately follow automated information. Tenney, 
Rogers [15] suggested that breakdown of 
human-automation interactions could generate 
unexpected crew behavior which could lead to adverse 
consequences.  
The failure path of human factors in aviation is 
associated with the active failures performed by 
front-line operators and latent failures generated in upper 
levels and which are normally dormant in the system [16, 
17]. Combined with other contributory factors, these 
failures might be able to break the system’s defense 
leading to major accidents. Automation issues are mainly 
related to active failures and have continually been 
reported to the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System 
(ASRS). The analysis of accident/incident reports should 
be just one aspect of a continuous safety auditing process.  
The approach of reactive analysis accidents alone is 
insufficient to ensure aviation safety and should be 
supplemented by a proactive approach of identifying the 
paths of hazards before they evolve into an accident. 
Therefore, the objectives of current research are to 
examine pilots’ active failures related to flight deck 
automation; to identify the paths of breakdown between 
human and automation interactions; and to develop the 
guidelines for increasing the effectiveness of 
human-automation interactions in order to improve 




4.1 Data collection 
NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) 
is the largest voluntary confidential reporting system in 
the world. Pilots submitted reports concerning safety of 
flight operations are reviewed before being made 
available on the database. Each submitted report outlines 
an occurrence in which the submitter considered safety to 
be compromised. Occurrence reporting aims to elicit 
information from near-miss events that may not be 
visible under the normal conditions during most flights. 
The data of current research was obtained taking into 
account Commercial Flights (Federal Aviation 
Administration part 121) that involved 
automation-related incidents in the landing phase. The 
ASRS Database is coded by NASA analysts with a 
specific taxonomy used to classify types of incident.   
To focus on human-automation Interaction issues 
raised on the flight deck, current research used incident 
reports by selected by the following criteria: 1. 
Automation problem: automation failure which affects 
the operation of a component, part or element such that it 
can no longer function as intended; automation fault 
which is exhibition of an item or system that may 
function partially with potential of leading to failure; and 
automation confusion in which systems are functioning 
normally but pilots were confusion by loss of situation 
awareness and commit human errors by 
mis-interpretating the automation systems. The 
components of automation systems involved in these 
occurrences including Approach coupler, Auto-flight 
system, Auto-throttle/Speed control, Instrument Landing 
System (ILS), Auto-land, Flight Control Computer, Radio 
Altimeter, Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning Systems 
(EGPWS), Alt hold/capture, Database, INS/NAV system, 
Primary Flight Display (PFD), Mode Control Panel 
(MCP), Air Data Computer, Flight Director, Flight Mode 
Annunciator (FMA); 2. Flight phases: Descent, Initial 
Approach, Final Approach, Landing; 3. Incident types: 
Altitude Cross Restriction not met, Altitude Overshot, 
Excursion from assigned Altitude, Track/Heading, Speed, 
Unstable Approach, Loss of Control, Encounter Control 
Flight Into Terrain (CFIT), Uneventful Procedure 
Deviation and Airborne Conflict. There are 257 
confidential reports derived from the ASRS in total. 
Current research did not involve collecting information 
directly from subjects, conducting experiments, taking 
samples, or any other invasive approaches.  Therefore, a 
low risk ethics proposal was approved by the Science and 
Engineering Research Ethics Committee of Cranfield 
University, United Kingdom. 
 
4.2 Research design 
The data analysis will utilise the active failures of 
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 
(HFACS) as a framework to categorise the 
human-automation interactions issues on the flight deck. 
Such taxonomic systems are suited to analysis of the 
factors that precipitate an event [18]. Based on Reason’s 
1990 ‘Swiss cheese model’, HFACS was developed to 
enable an understanding of human factors issues, and 
provide a systematic, data-driven approach to investment 
and interventions [2]. This human error taxonomy spans 
across four primary tiers then contains causal 
sub-categories to describe the contributory factors of 
active failures and latent failures. However, current 
research only focuses on automation and active failures 
on the flight deck, so the research framework was 
adapted to address pilots’ unsafe acts, including 4 
categories of decision-error, skill-based error, perceptual 
error and violation; and the pre-condition of unsafe acts 
including 7 categories of adverse mental states; adverse 
physiological states; physical/mental limitations; crew 
resource management; personal readiness; physical 
environment, and technological environment. Those 11 
categories of active failures of pilots may have interacted 
with automation systems directly and involved in the 
occurrence of safety concerns.  
4.3 Coding process 
Content analysis is the technique that uses a set of 
procedures to make valid inferences from description or 
reports. It includes large amounts of textual information 
and systematic identification of the properties, such as 
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the frequencies of terminology. The data was coded 
separately using content analysis into the 11 categories of 
active failures including unsafe acts of the operators and 
preconditions for unsafe acts, by an aviation human 
factors specialist and a pilot. Each report was classified 
into a framework structured to accommodate information 
provided by ASRS query and the 11 categories of active 
failures. The presence or absence of each category was 
assessed in each narrative respectively with 1 or 0. To 
avoid over representation, each category was counted a 
maximum of once per report and the count acted as an 
indication of the presence or absence of each active 
failure category. Prior to undertaking the present study 
these analysts also undertook the analysis of 523 aviation 
accident reports [5]. 
 
4.4 Statistical analysis 
A chi-square test was applied in order to determine 
whether there is a relationship between automation 
problems and categories of active failures. Since there is 
no dependent or independent variable in Chi-square tests, 
this was complemented with further analyses using 
Goodman and Kruskal’s tau. The value of tau has the 
advantage of being a directional statistic. The lower level 
categories of unsafe acts of pilots were designated as 
being dependent upon the categories at the higher level of 
precondition of unsafe acts in the framework, which is 
congruent with the framework’s underlying theoretical 
assumptions.  Finally, odds ratios were also calculated 
to quantify the likelihood of the presence of a 
contributory factor in one category being associated with 
the concomitant presence of a factor in another category.  
However, it must be noted that odds ratios are an 
asymmetric measure and so are only theoretically 
meaningful when associated with a non-zero value of tau 
(Li, Harris and Yu, 2008).   
 
V. RESULTS 
A total of 257 Commercial Aviation ASRS reports 
associated with automation related safety concerns were 
analyzed. The samples consisted of seven different 
aircraft manufacturers with 99 Boeing (38%), 52 Airbus 
(20%), 24 McDonnell Douglas (9%), 20 Bombardier 
(8%), 15 Embraer (6%), 3 Dash 8 (1%), and 1 Citation X 
(0.4%). Because of the confidential nature of reports, the 
type of aircraft was not available for 43 cases (16%).  
The highest frequency phase involving incidents was 
initial approach with 108 (41%), followed by descent 
with 92 (36%), final approach with 48 (19%) and 
Landing with 9 (4%). The ASRS reports have been 
summarized to 10 different types of incidents related to 
HAI issues presented in table 1. The majority of 
automation issues are automation mode confusion and 
component fault including flight management system, 
followed by auto-pilot, instrument landing system (ILS), 
approach coupler, auto-thrust, auto-land, alt/hold capture, 
mode control panel, radar altimeter and flight 
management computer. Furthermore, not only 
components on aircraft failed but also a number of 
unserviceable ILS facilities at the approaching airport. 
The frequencies and percentage of automation issues 
related to pilots’ active failures are shown in table 2. 
 
Table 1 Types of ASRS events (N = 257) 
Types of Incidents Frequency Percentage 
01. Altitude Cross  
Restriction not met 
52 20.23% 
02. Altitude Overshot 17 6.61% 
03. Excursion from  
assigned Altitude 
21 8.17% 
04. Track / Heading 57 22.18% 
Speed 12 4.67% 
05. Unstable Approach 22 8.56% 
06. LOC-I 13 5.06% 
07. Encounter CFIT 10 3.89% 
08. Uneventful 46 17.90% 
09. Procedure Deviation 5 1.95% 
10. Airborne Conflict 2 0.78% 
 
5.1 The association of automation breakdown and 
pilots’ active failures 
The analysis of 257 confidential reports found that 
automation fault is the highest frequency (137); followed 
by automation mode confusion (90), and the lowest 
frequency is automation failed (30) on the flight deck.  
 
Table 2 Automation problems and human factors issues on the 
flight deck 
 
Automation failure can be a difficult situation for pilots 
to understand the situation and may create a startle in the 
cockpit, as pilots may take too much time trying to 
understand the ambiguous information, which 
maydistract them from priority tasks and caused adverse 
outcomes. By analysing ASRS reports, it can be found 
that the highest occurrence of pilots’ active failures is 
‘technology environment’ (67.3%), followed by ‘crew 
Table 3 Chi-square, Goodman and Kruskal’s tau, and odds ratio 
of significant association between Automation breakdown and 
Contributing Factors Frequency Percentage 
Automation  
Problems 
Failed 30 11.7% 
Malfunction 137 53.3% 



























Violations 32 12.5% 




Decision errors 127 49.5% 
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pilots’ active failures (N=257) 
Note: 2: Chi-square, τ: Goodman & Kruskal’s tau 
 
Table 4 Chi-square, Goodman and Kruskal’s tau, and odds ratio 
of significant association between precondition of unsafe acts 
and unsafe acts of pilots (N=257) 
Note: 2: Chi-square, τ: Goodman & Kruskal’s tau 
resource management (CRM)’ (60.7%), ‘decision-errors’ 
(49.5%), ‘adverse mental states’ (47.5%), and 
‘skill-based errors’ (39.3%). Automation failure presents 
a difficult situation in modern cockpits which erodes the 
safety barriers and places additional workload onto the 
pilot, and it has created the precondition of unsafe acts 
for pilots to commit unsafe acts. The chi-square, 
Goodman and Kruskal’s tau, and odds ratio are used to 
examine the association between automation problems 
(failed, fault, and confused automation) and pilot’s active 
failures shown in table 3. It is the evidence of automation 
breakdown directly associated with pilots’ active failures 
in the cockpit. 
 
5.2 The association of precondition of unsafe acts 
and pilots’ unsafe acts 
Automation breakdown has direct impact on pilots’ 
cognitive processes, and has significant association with 
4 categories of HFACS level-2 including adverse mental 
state, technology environment, personal readiness, and 
CRM. Furthermore, it has indirect impact on 4 categories 
of unsafe acts of pilots (HFACS level-1). The application 
of chi-square, Goodman and Kruskal’s tau, and odds ratio 
enable to test the association between precondition of 
unsafe acts (level-2) and unsafe acts of pilots (level-1) 




 This study is focused on HAI issues which are the 
interaction between pilots and automations in the cockpit. 
It is suitable to confine the research scope to the landing 
phase of flight, as this phase of flight is associated with 
an increase in crew’s workload as they are manoeuvring 
the aircraft and monitoring the automation systems 
simultaneously. Automation Surprise is a common 
phenomenon of HAI breakdowns, and was defined as 
“situations where crews are surprised by actions taken (or 
not taken) by the auto-flight system” [19]. The term of 
‘surprise’ is adopted since pilots are not aware of the 
automation’s status or the aircraft’s status, until some 
events eventually trigger pilots’ attention. These 
situations may occur as a consequence of undetected 
faults or in a fully operational system affected by 
inappropriate inputs or “autonomous” operations, all of 
these ‘precondition of unsafe acts’ were caused by 
pilot-automation breakdowns, and could evolve to 
disaster. The HAI issues raised safety concerns had 
included loss of control, unstable approaches and 
uneventful occurrences during the landing phase, and 
associated with confusion by the mode control panel, 
faults of radio altimeter, and faults of the flight 
management system. Serious safety concerns were raised 
regarding the effects of automation reliability. However, 
automation complacency occurs under conditions of 
multiple-task load, when manual tasks compete with 
automated tasks for pilots’ attention. While pilots’ 
decision aid provided by automation systems is imperfect 
on the flight deck, it will have contributed to those 
incidents involving automation-induced human errors 
including both omission and commission errors [20]. 
6.1 The paths of HAI breakdown initiated by 
automation 
Automation breakdown 




ratio    2   p   τ   p 
Automation Confused * 
Decision-errors 
7.58 ** .03 ** 2.07 
Automation Confused * 
Technology environment 
161.48 *** .63 *** .11 
Automation Confused * 
Adverse Mental State 
8.72 ** .03 ** 2.18 
Automation Confused * CRM 29.74 *** .11 ** 5.31 
Automation Confused * 
Personal Readiness 
13.37 *** .05 *** 2.99 
Automation Malfunction * 
Violations 
5.06 * .072 * 2.48 
Automation Malfunction 
*Technology environment 
96.11 *** .374 *** 27.85 
Automation Malfunction *  
CRM 
8.16 ** .032 ** .47 
Automation Malfunction * 
Personal Readiness 
10.66 *** .041 ** .36 
Automation Failed * 
Decision-errors 
5.12 * .020 * .39 
Automation Failed * 
Technology environment 
13.29 *** .052 *** 16.71 
Automation Failed * Adverse 
Mental State 
7.93 ** .031 ** .30 
Automation Failed * CRM 13.42 *** .052 *** .23 
Automation breakdown 




ratio 2 p τ p 
Technology environment * 
Decision-errors 
19.23 *** .08 *** .29 
Adverse mental State * 
Decision-errors 




23.34 *** .09 *** 3.61 
Technology environment * 
Skill-based errors 
4.73 * .02 * .56 
Adverse mental State * 
Skill-based errors 
31.81 *** .12 *** 4.52 
Crew resource 
management * Skill-based 
errors 
60.28 *** .24 *** 12.74 
Adverse mental State * 
Perceptual errors 
5.49 * .02 * 2.75 
Crew resource 
management * Perceptual 
errors 
4.88 * .02 * 2.98 
Adverse mental State * 
Violations 
6.64 ** .03 ** 2.75 
Crew resource 
management * Violations 
8.58 ** .03 ** 4.02 
Personal readiness * 
Violations 
4.66 * .02 * 2.34 
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The complexity of automation has challenged flight 
crews in normal operations and become a serious risk 
when faults or failures have occurred which generate 
unexpected situations leading to adverse consequences 
[15]. The bold-arrow lines of figure 1 show direct 
impacts of automation breakdown on unsafe acts of pilots 
based on table 3.  The automation failure is significantly 
associated with pilots’ active failures such as ‘adverse 
mental states’ comprising task saturation, over confidence, 
tunnel vision and distractions; ‘CRM’ including lack of 
teamwork, failure to cross-check crew actions, and lack 
of leadership; and ‘technology environment’ 
encompassing inappropriate design of equipment and 
controls, display/interface characteristics, and checklist 
layouts;  and ‘decision-errors’ consisting of over 
reliance on automation, improper use of automation, 
inadequate knowledge of system and inappropriate 
procedure connected to task-related issues.  Automation 
fault has significantly associated with ‘CRM’, 
‘technology environment’, and ‘personal readiness’ 
including failure to prepare physically or mentally for 
duty, failures to adhere crew rest requirements, 
overexertion when off-duty, self-medicating, and 
inadequate training; and ‘violations’ including routine or 
exceptional violated SOP or technical manuals.  
Automation confusion has significantly associated 
with ‘adverse mental states’, ‘CRM’, ‘personal readiness’, 
‘technology environment’, and ‘decision-errors’.  All of 
these 3 categories of automation issues have significantly 
associated with 8 categories of pilots’ active failures 
shown as the straight lines in figure 1. Further analysis of 
the strength of association between the 3 categories of 
automation issues and 7 categories of ‘pre-conditions for 
unsafe acts’ indicated 21 (3*7) pairs of statistical 
associations in which 13 pairs of associations were 
significant (p < 0.05). All of these 13 pairs of significant 
associations were high odds ratios values and with 
non-zero values of tau (τ).  The values of odds ratios 
(table 3) indicate that the presentence of ‘automation 
failure’ will be 16 times more likely to occur pilot’s 
active failure of a concomitant active failures of 
‘technology environment’; and the presence of 
‘automation fault’ almost 2.5 times more likely to occur a 
concomitant active failure of ‘violations’. Furthermore, 
the odds ratios suggested that the presence of ‘automation 
confusion’ is almost 5 times more likely to occur 
concomitant active failure of ‘CRM’ problem on the 
flight deck. 
 
6.2 The indirect impacts of automation failures to 
pilots’ performance 
Technological evolution has provided automation 
with an increasing level of “decision” and “autonomy” 
inducing the HAI problems. Systems are able to 
compensate automatically for unanticipated aircraft states 
like asymmetric thrust, turbulences or auto-trim [13]. In 
other cases, automation provide silent protection for the 
flight envelope (stall, over-speed, bank angle) without 
giving explicit notification of what is doing. This 
out-of-the-loop situation can be worsened by a lack of 
physical feedback, such as side-stick and auto-throttle not 
moving accordingly to the autopilot commands, making 
it less obvious to pilots the task of tracking and 
monitoring automated actions [9, 21]. The dotted lines of 
figure 1 illustrated indirect impacted of automation 
breakdowns on pilots’ unsafe acts based on table 4.   
Current research finds that automation breakdowns 
have direct associated with 4 categories of precondition 
of unsafe acts, including ‘adverse mental states’, ‘CRM’, 
‘personal readiness’, and ‘technology environment’.  
According to the theoretical framework of HFACS, it has 
demonstrated that those 4 categories in the upper levels 
have further impacts on the downward level of unsafe 
acts of operators, including ‘decision-errors’ such as over 
reliance on automation, improper use of automation, 
‘skill-based errors’ including failure to prioritize attention, 
loss of mode awareness, and inadvertent operation; 
‘perceptual errors’ such as misjudgement of the aircraft’s 
altitude, attitude, or airspeed, and spatial disorientation; 
and ‘violations’ such as deviated SOPs of automation 
systems. Further analysis of the strength of association 
between categories of ‘pre-conditions for unsafe acts’ and 
‘unsafe acts of operators’ demonstrated that 28 (7*4) 
pairs of statistical associations in which 11 pairs of 
associations were significant (p < 0.05). All of these 11 
pairs of significant associations were high odds ratios 
values and with non-zero values of tau (τ).  The values 
of odds ratios indicate that the presentence of ‘CRM’ is 
almost 3.6 times, 12.7 times, 3 times, and 4 times more 
likely to occur concomitant active failures of 
‘decision-errors’, ‘skill-based error’, ‘perceptual errors’, 
and ‘violations’; the presence of ‘adverse mental states’ 
almost 4.5 times more likely to occur a concomitant 
active failure of ‘skill-based errors’ (table 4 and figure 1). 
 
6.3 The prioritized functions between Automation 
and flight crew 
Current study find that automation is less likely, and 
the flight crews were most likely, to be involved as a 
precursor to events involving both skill-based and 
decision errors, as pilots were more likely to make 
decision errors where they were unaware of the source of 
the problem.  An important feature of the difference 
between automation and human operators is the 
capability to maintain constant manoeuvre over long 
period of time without suffering from fatigue. 
Furthermore, flight crews may be aware of the problem, 
but their ability to intervene and resolve the problem may 
be inhibited by their lack of understanding the 
complexity of aircraft systems – the autonomy authority, 
complexity, coupling, and observability [22]. The 
accidents of Asiana-214 and Air France-447, 
demonstrated that HAI breakdown of impoverished 
awareness of the underlying functionality of automation 
systems, and the relinquishing of authority by the 
automation back to the pilots, are not problems of the 
past of traditional cockpit but affects are still present in 
an advanced cockpit. The designers of automations have 
to be aware of the natural limitation of human being’s 
cognitive processes in order to create a human-centered 
system which is able to process all necessary information 
to meet the needs of pilots [23]. 
The Activated Failures of Human-Automation Interactions on the Flight Deck 
 
 
HAI is an important characteristic of many modern 
operational situations and understanding the relationship 
between human factors and automation issues would help 
designers of flight deck automations to develop 
human-centered systems. Reason [17] has suggested that 
there is a ‘many to one’ mapping of precondition of 
unsafe acts and pilots’ unsafe acts, making it difficult to 
predict which actual errors will occur as a result of which 
preconditions. The results of current study support this 
assertion. Figure 1 demonstrated that “CRM” is the most 
critical category for developing safety mechanism for 
accident prevention, as “CRM” is not only associated 
with automation failure, automation fault and automation 
confusion, but also has impacted to ‘decision-errors’, 
‘skill-based errors’, ‘perceptual errors’ and ‘violations’ on 
the unsafe acts of pilots (figure 1). Pilots confronted by 
automation failure might be confused by information 
displayed on interfaces which related to a failure to 
‘monitor’ the status of flight mode control panel, or 
auto-throttle system could potentially lead to accident. 
However, it is the pilots’ actions and decisions which 
ensure the aircraft landing safely during automation 
breakdowns. Therefore, good practice of CRM did 
demonstrate the effectiveness of intervention for aviation 
safety, and it can be supported by the example of United 




Figure 1 The paths of pilots’ active failures associated with automation issues on the flight deck 
Pilots have to monitor automated systems to rapidly 
processing complex and dynamic situations, and most of 
the time the processes of automated systems are based on 
complex rules and SOPs that are difficult for human 
operators to follow. Over-reliance on automated systems 
can degrade pilots’ situation awareness and 
decision-making. When the automation systems failed or 
pilots confused by automation, the lack of awareness of 
the state of the systems can inhibit the crew’s ability to 
recover the situation [24]. These are automation-induced 
errors which precipitate an event and can adversely 
disturb the crew and their situation awareness of the 
underlying causes. Where the attribution of a fault is not 
clear the crew’s ability to predict the path and identify the 
correct course of action is very limited. Analysis of 
accident and incident reports suggested that monitoring 
failures are often responsible for breakdowns in 
pilot-automation coordination resulted in decision errors 
or violations [19]. There are lots of automation systems 
integrated with the flight deck and they might have 
affected among each other, such as auto-pilot, 
auto-throttle, auto-land, auto-trim, integrated navigation 
system, flight management system/computer, flight mode 
annunciator, mode control panel, and ground proximity 
warning system. The failures of those automation 
systems may create potential risks of altitude cross 
restriction not being met, altitude overshooting, 
track/heading, speed, unstable approach, encounter CFIT, 
and airborne conflict. It is an important aspect in 
determining how a new piece of automation is designed 
to intervene in one dimension without affecting other 




The findings based on ASRS reports show that in general 
pilots represent the last line of defence during automation 
failures, though sometimes pilots did commit active 
failures that combined with automation-induced human 
errors. Current research identifies “CRM” as the most 
critical category for developing intervention of HAI to 
improve aviation safety. For automation breakdowns, 
pilots can still manually control the aircraft using 
problem-solving skill by applying CRM skills to operate 
the aircraft. In summary, there are thousands reports of 
ASRS safety concern regarding HAI issues. However, it 
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is unknowable how often instances within the various 
active failures of human errors occur in day-to-day flight 
operations that have not resulted in accidents. The 
analysis of confidential reports related to automation 
breakdowns allows pilots to share experiences without 
being involved incidents or accidents. The credit must be 
rewarded to those pilots who were able to save the 
aircraft without adverse outcomes that might have 
damaged aircraft or passengers. Variations in flight deck 
automation should be evaluated to identify the standards 
of a pilot’s minimum safe performance in order to 
maintain safety of flight operations. Future HAI research 
should continue to increase the reliability of automation 
on the flight deck, develop backup system for the 
occasional failures of cockpit automation, and train flight 
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